基于生长的激励措施，而不是关税，将加强美国芯片制造和领导力

经过半导体工业协会

2018年，美国对美国的进口到中国的新的半导体和其他商品的关税，在301条对中国的不公平贸易实践调查后，对美国的进口量施加了25％的关税。Since 60% of U.S. semiconductor imports from China are originally made in the U.S., distributed through global supply chains, and imported by U.S. companies for themselves, U.S. chipmakers have borne the brunt of the $750 million in duties paid on chip imports since July 2018. Some policymakers believe that imposing even more tariffs on semiconductors and other goods will “reshore” chip production to the U.S. While tariffs arguably helped bring China to the negotiating table for a broader trade deal, tariffs on semiconductors fail to incentivize domestic chip production and will only serve to further erode America’s manufacturing base and technological leadership (see SIA one-pager这里）。

与技术制造部门的许多其他部分不同，美国半导体的重要部分已经在美国设计和制造。美国半导体制造公司在美国的前端制造能力中保持了大约44％，导致制造业工作稳定，与其他部门相比是一种令人印象深刻的壮举。完成后，在美国，大多数公司在美国大多数公司在集会，包装和测试的最后阶段发货（否则称为ATP）。该低价ATP（芯片的约10％的值）已经发生在第三个国家数十年，允许美国芯片制造商专注于先进，高附加值的设计和制造。Imposing duties on chip imports causes U.S. semiconductor makers to pay tariffs on their own goods, diminishing their competitiveness by reducing available capital to invest in R&D, and raising the costs of their products at a time when China is champing at the bit to assume a leadership role in semiconductor technology, especially with regard to chip manufacturing. Moreover, while nearly half of U.S. firms’ manufacturing capacity is here in the U.S., 82% of their sales are to customers overseas, making semiconductors our 5^TH.最大的出口。If the U.S. imposes WTO-illegal tariffs on chip imports from other countries, U.S. companies will face WTO-sanctioned reciprocal retaliatory tariffs in these important overseas markets, which will negatively impact the sales that support manufacturing jobs here in the U.S and undermine our $8 billion global semiconductor trade surplus.

但这只是故事的一半。半导体的关税也威胁要在依赖半导体技术的先进技术领域中威胁到美国制造业，包括未来的必备技术，如人工智能，航空航天，下一代网络，自动车辆和机器人。If the cost of key inputs such as semiconductors is too high, tech manufacturers will be forced to contemplate relocating out of the U.S. and investing in more business-friendly countries to maintain their competitiveness vis a vis China and other nations who have not imposed similar tariffs. This would be a devastating blow to the U.S. advanced manufacturing sector, costing jobs and further eroding U.S. manufacturing and technological competitiveness. The record drop in new foreign investments in the U.S. manufacturing sector from $202.5 billion in 2018 to $78.2 billion in 2019, following the implementation of Section 301 tariffs in 2018, underscores this point (资料来源：经济分析局）。

进一步解开这一点，了解半导体制造的经济学是很重要的。今天，建立半导体工厂并不便宜。最先进的FAB（即逻辑铸造）的成本为18-270亿美元，以建立和运营，并取决于数万种全球供应商，用于关键投入，包括设备和材料。美国半导体公司投入了大量的时间和资源，以在美国内外开发他们的运营和供应链。高关税不会强迫公司放弃这些固定成本资产和高效的供应链，这些资产在这一竞争激烈的R＆D密集型和高支出行业中实现了美国全球领导。

鉴于该行业对美国经济，技术领导力和国家安全的重要性，美国政策制定者是优先考虑的国产工厂建设。然而，许多国家的原因在于半导体制造能力的增长，是因为这些政府提供了吸引工厂的主要财务激励。例如，中国，台湾，新加坡，日本，韩国，爱尔兰，以色列，德国和法国等国家为制造，税收抵免，股权投资，市场低于市场贷款，免费或补贴土地提供了数十亿美元，补贴设备，基础设施开发，劳动力培训等等。虽然2017年税制改革是一项欢迎改善，但美国根本没有在联邦一级的可比制造奖励。

美国政策制定者吸引半导体制造的最有效的方法不是关税，而是联邦拨款，研发资金和税收抵免等金融激励，以建立所提议的设想的工厂和研究设施美国行动的筹码和美国铸造件采取行动。The total cost of these proposed bills to the American taxpayer would be roughly $30 billion (without tax credits), which is significantly less than the $93-185 billion price tag of 25%-50% tariffs on U.S. semiconductor imports over the next 10 years. Putting policies in place to incentivize domestic fab construction that are competitive with those offered abroad by other governments should be a priority for U.S. policymakers and build on past successes with DARPA and Sematech, which helped make the U.S. industry into the semiconductor powerhouse and world leader it is.